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This article argues that regional security cooperation in South-East Asia, mainly promoted by the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), is a response to China´ s economic rise. Although 
China is not regarded as a military challenge, Beijing’s ascension threatens to undermine the regional 
balance of power. The emerging insecurities threaten the stability of the regimes whose power is based 
on output legitimacy. Cooperation, the thesis states, can reduce these uncertainties. Yet, whereas 
collaboration in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) offers Beijing incentives for the strengthening of 
its “enlightened” multilateralism, regional cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) will not change China’s behaviour. The reason is that this cooperation is based on Realpolitik 
motives. Offensive Realism seems therefore well suited to analyse the Central Asian power relations. 
Even though the dimension of cooperation has not been included in John Mearsheimer’s approach, 
this article demonstrates that it can conceptually be integrated into offensive Realism without 
contradicting its core theses. For this, however, its adherents must accept two assumptions: First, 
that the domestic political logic – in case of Beijing the output legitimacy of the Communist Party 
– must be integrated. Second, that there exists no automatism in international politics. Otherwise 
one would have to speak of the tragic of offensive Realism: Policies, based on this perception, does 
not offer China suffi cient incentives to further pursue multilateralism. 
Keywords: Regionalism, Regional Cooperation, Security, China, ASEAN, ASEAN Regional Forum, 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
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In diesem Aufsatz wird argumentiert, dass die regionale sicherheitspolitische Integration in Südost- 
und Nordostasien, primär von der südostasiatischen Staatengemeinschaft ASEAN vorangetrieben, 
eine Reaktion auf Chinas wirtschaftlichen Aufstieg verkörpert. Dieser droht das regionale 
Kräftegleichgewicht zu untergraben, wodurch er Unsicherheiten weckt und damit eine Gefahr 
für die auf Stabilität angewiesenen Regime darstellt, die ihre Macht auf Output-Legitimation 
gründen. Kooperation, so die These, kann diese Unsicherheiten reduzieren. Doch während die 
Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen des ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Pekings Außenpolitik Anreize zur 
Stärkung seines aufgeklärten Multilateralismus bietet, sind entsprechende Verhaltensänderung 
von der regionalen Zusammenarbeit in Zentralasien nicht zu erwarten. Dies weil die Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) nach wie vor rein auf realpolitischen Motiven basiert und weshalb 
offensiver Realismus bestens zur Analyse der Machtverhältnisse Zentralasiens geeignet scheint. Die 
Dimension Kooperation ist in John Mearsheimers Ansatz zwar nicht vorgesehen, wie dieser Aufsatz 
zeigt, kann sie jedoch konzeptionell in den offensiven Realismus integriert werden, ohne dessen 
Kernthesen zu widersprechen. Allerdings müssten VertreterInnen des offensive Realismus dafür zwei 
gedankliche Erweiterungen akzeptieren: Zum einen, dass die innenpolitische Logik im Falle Pekings 
die Output-Legitimation der Kommunistischen Partei integriert werden muss. Zum anderen, dass 
es keinen Automatismus in internationaler Politik gibt. Andernfalls müsste von einer Tragik des 
offensivem Realismus gesprochen werden: Politik, basierend auf dieser Anschauung, bietet China 
nicht genügend Anreize, um weiterhin eine multilateralen Kurs zu verfolgen. 
Schlagworte: Regionalismus, regionale Kooperation, Sicherheit, China, ASEAN, ASEAN Regional 
Forum, Shanghai Cooperation Organization
1. Introduction 
After the first decolonisation wave in the 1950s and early 1960s, the newly independent 
nations in Asia, Africa and Latin America were, at least verbally, committed to strengthening 
their economic and political cooperation with their neighbours. Similar to Europe, regional 
collaboration was driven both by internal and external rationales, though the negatively 
defined security motives dominated. Hence regional collaboration was regarded as a strategic 
means to secure the survival of the fragile new regimes by reducing external interferences 
in the processes of nation-building and socioeconomic development. Wary of protecting their 
sovereignty and usually distrusting their neighbours, cooperation was – despite the overarching 
security goals – limited to economic, technical and cultural affairs. Even integration advocates 
agreed to this cautious, evolutionary approach as many of them regarded limited functional 
collaboration as the first step in the direction of (sub-)regional political unity. Thus from 
the 1960s on, regional cooperation was formalised and institutionalised throughout the Third 
World through regional treaties and intergovernmental organisations such as the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and on sub-
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regional level (e.g. the Economic Community of West African States or the Andean Pact). 
Regional economic cooperation was en vogue in the 1960s, though very limited, due to the 
complimentary character of the involved economies and the dominance of import-substitution 
industrialization (Bhalla & Bhalla 1997: 1–9). 
In one region, though, regional cooperation has been elusive ever since: in North-East 
Asia, which lacked multilateral structures till the early 1990s (Ikenberry & Tsuchiyama 2002: 
70). Even in South-East Asia, though, till the late 1980s it was more appropriate to speak 
of regionalization – transnational and regional collaboration promoted by the market forces, 
especially multinational companies, or transnational active ethnic networks – rather than of 
regionalism, i.e. the deliberate political steering of regional cooperation in different political 
spheres (Fawcett 2004: 431–434; Dent 2003: 121). Only in the late 1980s did the South-East 
Asian governments, organized in ASEAN, respond proactively to the external security and 
economic challenges with a deepening of their integration efforts. Nevertheless, ASEAN was 
on the forefront of the second wave of regionalism that gained momentum in the mid-1980s. 
Fuelled by the rising economic interdependence, the fears of (Western) trade blocs and 
globalization, this new regionalism tends to be open, non-discriminatory and inclusive (Liu 
2003a: 13; Bhalla & Bhalla 1997). 
Since the early 1990s ASEAN is the key promoter of regional cooperation, even in the 
sensitive realm of security, and this both in South-East and North-East Asia. What has not 
changed, though, is the domestic logic of regional collaboration: the governments regard it 
as a means to mitigate external influences that could endanger economic development. As 
the legitimacy of the semi-democratic or authoritarian regimes in South-East Asia is primarily 
based on their ability to deliver economic benefits to their citizens rather than on respect 
for due democratic processes – output instead of input legitimacy –, an economic downturn 
could be a direct threat to their survival (cf. Cheng 2006: 91). To secure a stable regional 
political order is therefore a conditio sine qua non for economic growth, trade, foreign direct 
investments and tourism. 
The main thesis of this article argues that due to the political primacies of output legitimacy 
and regional stability, regional security cooperation in South-East and North-East is a reaction 
to today’s single most crucial challenge for stability and the balance of power in South-East 
and North-East Asia: China´ s economic, political and military rise to a great power. Yet, the 
argument is, that China’s rise does not raise fears of a military dominance in East Asia. Rather 
Beijing´ s ascension still causes feelings of uncertainty in regard to China´ s perceptions and 
strategic long-term intentions (Chung 2008: 172; Ong 2007: 721; Dillon & Tkacik 2005). In 
order to diminish these uncertainties, ASEAN attempts since the mid-1990s to engage and 
even “socialize” Beijing through multilateral cooperation. 
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The research question asks, first, whether regional security cooperation in East Asia 
has altered China’s diplomatic behaviour. Secondly, it will be assessed if offensive Realism 
(Mearsheimer 2003) is conceptually able to explain regional security collaboration. Therefore 
ASEAN s´ (Chapter 2) as well as China´ s motives for cooperation in the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) will be analysed, examining Beijing’s adoption of multilateralism in the mid-1990s 
(Chapter 3). In addition, the reasons for regional security collaboration in East Asia will be 
compared with the cooperation logic in the Central Asian Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) (Chapters 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). It will be demonstrated that, unlike in the SCO, the China 
factor or the “China threat” played a decisive role for the creation of the ARF. 
Despite the focus on two multilateral institutions as promoters of regional collaboration 
offensive Realism rather than liberal institutionalism (Dunne 2008; Keohane & Martin 1995) will 
be applied (Chapter 3.2). The reason is that neorealist approaches seem best suited to explain 
the competitive strategic landscape both in East and Central Asia. Yet while offensive Realism 
is a realistic approach to conceptually frame China’s rise, it is analytically limited to examine 
great power relations. In addition, it regards cooperation only as a tool for the governments 
(Mearsheimer 2003: chap. 2). As regional collaboration is a reality both in East and Central 
Asia, it will be asked if the dimension of cooperation can be added to the conceptual frame 
of offensive Realism, without contradicting its basic theoretical assumptions. 
2. Regional Cooperation in South-East and North-East Asia 
2.1 External Motives in ASEAN’s Integration Process
After the end of the ideological and military superpower rivalry in 1989/91, the perspective 
of a political power vacuum – and in particular the perception that Japan or China might aim 
to fill it – threatened security in the Asia-Pacific. Moscow, after the demise of the Warsaw 
Pact, lacked the political will as well as the financial and diplomatic resources for pursuing 
an active East Asia policy. Washington, the hegemonic power since 1945, downgraded its 
political engagement (Gershman 2002: 60–61). Among certain Asian nations this gave rise to 
the perception of a strategic retreat of the US (Leifer 1999: 34). After the terror bombings of 
September 11, 2001, when the new Bush administration started to view South-East Asia as the 
second front in the war on terror, Washington once again intensified its strategic commitment. 
Yet, its focus on security issues and bilateral cooperation with key allies conflicts with “the 
region’s priorities of domestic economic development and political stability” (Economy 2005: 
411; cf. interviews in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, December 2008). 
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The looming power vacuum was especially dangerous in North-East Asia, as in this region 
multilateral collaboration was the exception, not the rule (Liu & Régnier 2003). The South-East 
Asian nations were since the 1960s used to cooperation in a broad area of policy fields, although 
the collaboration was not deep reaching till 1992. Like in other world regions, cooperation 
has been mainly driven by external factors and domestic logics: The primary motive for 
Bangkok, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Manila for establishing the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations in 1967 was to reduce outside interferences into their socioeconomic 
development and nation-building, be it from their ASEAN partners, East Asian or outside 
actors (Kahler 2000: 551). At this time, ASEAN’s main external threats were the negative 
security impacts of the Vietnam war and communist infiltration. With two security orientated 
initiatives, the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971 and the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 1976, ASEAN subsequently aimed to insulate itself “from great 
power maneuverings” (Garofano 2002: 514). Moreover, the TAC was also a proactive attempt 
to order South-East Asia according to the principles of the “ASEAN way” and the start of 
closer cooperation with the US, Japan and the United Nations to resolve the Indochina crisis. 
Facing the common threat posed by Vietnam, in the early 1990s ASEAN’s diplomatic conflict 
resolution approach in Indochina proved highly successful, also due to Hanoi´ s new doi moi 
policies and superpower détente. However, even at this time ASEAN was divided whether 
Vietnam or China should be regarded as the bigger security threat (Leifer 1999: 30). 
The end of the superpower rivalry, though, also questioned ASEAN’s raison d e´tre. In 
dire need of a new political purpose, ASEAN decided at the Singapore summit in 1992 to use 
economic tools to deepen its integration (Capie 2003: 154–155). The ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA) was a response to the European Community’s Single Market project and the North 
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) but also a symbol for ASEAN’s inability to agree on a 
common security policy able to address the new transnational security menaces (cf. Antolik 
1992: 144 and 147–151). 
In 1997, though, the Asian Financial crisis uncovered the deficiencies of ASEAN’s cautious 
integration approach. The institution seemed politically paralyzed and lacked the authority 
to enforce the AFTA commitments (Dent 2007: 24). Accusing Washington and the Western 
dominated International Monetary Fund (IMF) of prescribing the wrong cure, many East Asian 
politicians turned to Beijing for support. Indeed, China played a positive role in resolving the 
crisis (Cheng 2006: 94), in particular in ASEAN plus Three which connects ASEAN institutionally 
with China, Japan and South Korea. Initially limited to financial collaboration, ASEAN+3 
evolved into the most important multilateral forum in East Asia, covering strategic, political 
and economic issues (Beeson 2003, Stubbs 2002). However, as the logic of regional cooperation 
is an economical one (Wanandi 2005: 324), it comes as no surprise that the main achievement 
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of this comprehensive collaboration is economical: the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA). 
Yet there is also a crucial psychological and political outcome: an increase of mutual trust. In 
initiating CAFTA and, in particular, offering the lesser developed ASEAN partners significant 
economic concessions (“early harvest”), improved its image and credibility in South-East Asia 
(cf. interviews in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, December 2008). 
In retrospect, the financial and political crisis of 1997 was also a catalyst for deeper 
integration. Acknowledging the limits of the “ASEAN way” (ASEAN Eminent Persons Group 
2000), in 2003 ASEAN announced its ambitious plans for an Asian Community by the year 
2015, based on an economic, security and socio-cultural pillar (Bali Concord II). Yet, these 
objectives remain to be filled with concrete policies. 
Overall, regional cooperation in South-East Asia – a region that has always been successful in 
accommodating external influences (SarDesai 2003) – can till the early 1990s be best described 
as “reactionary regionalism” (Beeson 2003: 251). Although economic motives dominated, the 
notion in South-East Asia has always been that mutual economic progress facilitates a stable 
and peaceful regional order. In the early 1990s, though, the regional political and economic 
dynamics did profoundly change (Shambaugh 2005: 64), with China´ s perceived quest for 
regional dominance being the core strategic challenge for North-East and South-East Asia 
(Collins 2000: 133). ASEAN’s strategic and institutional response – its initiative for creating the 
ASEAN Regional Forum – symbolizes the adoption of a more proactive approach. 
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Table 1:  Periodization of ASEAN‘s Integration Process
Period
1967–1975
1976–1992
1992–1997
1997–2002
2003–
Overall Orientation
domestic
domestic, increasingly regional
domestic and regional 
regional
pan-regional 
Type of Regionalism
Reactionary or negative
Limited, “diplomatic”
Neutral, “bandwagon” 
Cautious proactive
Proactive 
Driving Forces
external: security
security; market
trade, security 
economics,
“Asianness”, 
China’s rise
China’s rise,
output legitimacy,  
“Asianness” 
Source: Own compilation. 
2.2 The ASEAN Regional Forum: Dialoguing, Socializing, Befriending
In the 1990s, there was – and still is – no shortage of unresolved disputes in East Asia. Inter 
alia, the tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the Sino-Taiwanese relations or the island disputes 
in the South Chinese Sea could escalate into a regional military conflict. On the other hand 
both abstract and concrete transnational threats have increased. These include, for instance, 
piracy, illegal trafficking of drugs, weapons and people, social inequalities, the spread of mass 
diseases or environmental degradation (Rüland 2005). The main fear in the 1990s, though, 
was that a vague feeling of insecurity in the region, rooted in mutual distrust, could hamper 
the national socioeconomic development processes. This in a region where the legitimacy 
of the majority of the governments is based on their ability to create and distribute wealth 
(Cheng 2006: 91). 
Even though many governments in East Asia acknowledged the need for multilateral 
regional security cooperation after 1989, the priority for sovereignty and non-interference, 
the unresolved conflicts among many nations and the lack of a clearly definable common 
threat overshadowed all hopes for a big institutional bang such as the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) mechanism (Acharya 1997: 321). The creation of the ARF in 
1994 thus reflects a compromise – and the fairly moderate expectations of the governments 
in regard to security collaboration. Yuen Foong Khong’s pointed summary of Michael Leifer’s 
(1996) “line of reasoning” still sums up best the intentions of the ARF: “(t)o keep (a) the 
United States in, (b) China and Japan down, and (c) ASEAN relevant and safe (…)” (Khong 
1997: 290). In addition, the new security structures should provide possibilities for regular 
meetings, exchange of information, dialogue and confidence building measures to decrease 
mutual distrust and uncertainties through the acquaintance with different ways of strategic 
thinking (Kawasaki 2006; ARF 1995). 
Accordingly, the focus of the loosely institutionalized ARF is, unlike in the highly 
institutionalized Western security institutions, on cooperative, not on collective security. 
Security is defined in comprehensive terms, including traditional as well as non-traditional 
threats. Regarded as an honest (Asian) broker, the other East Asian nations allowed the 
political and military comparatively weak ASEAN to take the leadership role in institution-
building in East Asia. Basically, the ARF is an extended multilateralized version of the ASEAN 
Post-Ministerial Conferences (PMC) that ASEAN holds with key dialogue partners after its 
foreign minister meetings. Hence the guiding ASEAN principles of non-interference, non-
discrimination, pragmatism, voluntarism, informal and consensual rather than rule-based 
majority decision-making – the (in-)famous “ASEAN Way” (Acharya 2001: 172–179; Acharya 
1997: 328–333; Kawasaki 2006: 222–223) – are reflected in the ARF. Chaired by ASEAN, it is 
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also the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta that oversees the work of the ARF which has no own 
bureaucracy. Overall, as Amitav Acharya (2004: 259) puts it: “The ARF imitates ASEAN’s 
organizational minimalism.” In many senses, not only ASEAN and the ARF but also the ARF and 
the broad Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) can be regarded as twins. 
Notwithstanding the justified criticism, the establishment of the ARF reflects a major 
political breakthrough, as in 1994 both Beijing and Washington were committed to a bilateral 
rather than multilateral approach. In addition, the short- and mid-term focus of ASEAN as the 
ARF architect was fairly ambitious: to install a process of dialogue and confidence-building 
that both broadens and deepens over time. Only after the institution has reached a more 
mature stage, an evolution into a more robust conflict resolving institution seemed political 
feasible for ASEAN (ARF 1995). And in fact, since 1994 the security organization has gradually 
progressed institutionally and normatively: Annual ministerial meetings evolved into more 
frequent senior official and military expert meetings, and the civil society participation in the 
“track two” mechanism has been strengthened, as have the confidence building measures. 
Highlighting the political logic behind the ARF process, Chien-peng Chung (2008: 172) 
writes: “The essential idea behind the ARF is that the process of dialoguing should lead to 
socialization of member states’ behavior, which in turn ought to result in the dissolution of 
conflicts of interests.” Overall, the ARF approach combines the balance of power concept, the 
principle of inclusive regionalism, the notion of conflict resolution together with, not against 
certain countries and the idea of socializing or even befriending the partners (cf. Acharya 
2001: 173). 
Although the ARF is today the only organisation in East Asia with an exclusive security 
focus, it is politically far from resembling a regional security system. The prospects for the 
evolution into a “security community” in Karl W. Deutsch s´ sense remain even more remote 
(Rolfe 2008: 106–107; Wanandi 2005). This the case due to severe political obstacles such as 
the exclusion of the Sino-Taiwanese and the North Korean dispute but also because of the 
restricting “ASEAN” diplomatic values (Acharya 2001: 178; Khong 1997: 292). The next step in 
the ARF s´ evolution would be to go behind confidence building and adopt preventive conflict 
resolution. 
Overall, in its present form the ARF cannot resolve ASEAN’s main concern: While the 
ASEAN members do appreciate China’s new multilateralism, they remain skeptical in regard 
to Beijing’s true long-term intentions and ambitions. All these shortcomings raise serious 
questions in regard to the ability of the ARF to contain or assimilate the rising China. Though 
this is, according to John Mearsheimer, a political necessity. The strategic regional – and global 
– impacts of Beijing´ s possible strive for hegemony in East Asia have been conceptualized in his 
theory of offensive Realism. 
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3. Beijing’s New Multilateral Credentials: Engaging in the ARF and the SCO 
3.1 China s´ Rise and its New Multilateral Credentials
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping succeeded in the post-Mao internal power struggles of the Communist 
Party of China (CPC). Replacing the economic principles of self-reliance and inward-orientation 
with the market principle and integration into the world market, the new momentum of the 
Chinese economy elevated China´ s position in the regional and global distribution of economic 
and political power. In the first phase, the regime focussed on achieving economic growth, 
accepting tremendous social inequalities especially among rural and urban citizens. Politically 
Beijing opened up to the outside world too: Having played a “destabilizing and negative” 
(Limaye 2007: 459) role in East Asia after 1949 (e.g. support for Communist insurgents), China 
started to redefine its political and economic relations with North-East and South-East Asia 
(India discovered its East Asian neighbourhood only in the late 1990s). Though, in accordance 
with Deng’s credo, it kept a low profile in regional (and global) politics (Wang 2005: 675). 
Till the mid-1990s, it pursued its interests bilaterally. Once diplomatic relations has been 
established with Jakarta and Singapore in 1990 and Seoul in 1992, China´ s trade with the 
respective countries boomed. From 1991 on, Beijing and ASEAN gradually improved their 
relations too, starting with scientific, educational, trade and economic collaboration (Lijun 
2003: 2). The new charm offensive in East Asia was not at least a strategic response to the 
diplomatic isolation China faced in the Western world after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989. 
Acknowledging the demise of the Communist ideology as the main source for its legitimacy, 
the CPC leadership, divided in the aftermath of “Tiananmen”, adopted the concept of a rational-
authoritarian order and technocratic leadership (Guo 2003: 11–16). It started to increasingly 
base its legitimacy on its ability to furthermore ensure socioeconomic development, i.e. output 
legitimacy (National Intelligence Council 2008: 28–29; Wang 2005: 681–686). Subsequently, 
as the domestic aims of the Chinese reform policies have become logically increasingly 
connected to the foreign policy sphere, the fears of social and political unrests at the domestic 
front triggered a fundamental change in Beijing´ s foreign policy: already in the mid-1990s, 
it reduced its bilateralism in favour of multilateralism (Qinggong & Wei 1997). The “fourth 
generation” under Hu Jintao, in charge since 2002, has further embraced multilateralism – 
and pragmatism: the party has realized that a favourable (“harmonious”) regional and global 
environment, created through multilateral collaboration, is the conditio sine qua non for the 
creation of a modestly rich, harmonious society with a more just income distribution Hu 
Jintao envisions (Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China 
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2005: chap. V). Such a middle class society would also be a political insulator against possible 
nationalist sentiments that could trigger a more aggressive, nationalistic foreign policy. 
Yet exactly because of its burgeoning economic power its neighbours – and the world in 
general – remain skeptical in regard to the true intentions of the CPC. The Chinese leadership, 
though, knows that it must reduce this distrust. Thus in 2004 the then Prime Minister Wen 
Jiabo claimed China would never seek regional hegemony (Xinhua News Agency 2004; cf. Li 
Zhaoxing 2006), painting the picture of a status quo power. Overall, the new doctrine from 
2003 states that Beijing´ s rise is peaceful (heping jueqi) – and beneficial for the whole world. 
For its socioeconomic development China needs the world (Zhang 2008: 16–17; Ong 2007: 
footnote 13), in particular secure access to raw materials in South America, Africa, Central 
Asia or Australia. But, as the self-assured leadership adds, the world also needs China. In this 
view, China’s peaceful rise offers a win-win situation for humankind. Accordingly, under Hu 
the CPC has officially further embraced multilateralism and “is using a sophisticated blend of 
trade, confidence building measures, and even development assistance to establish itself as 
an important regional leader” (Economy 2005: 413). 
Paradoxically, the more Beijing increases its multilateral credentials, the more the Chinese 
leadership is confronted with a strategic and political dilemma: while the West demands clear 
words and actions from China, notably where it clearly yields political influence, such as in 
Burma, North Korea or Sudan (cf. Rice 2008), the CPC’s response to the distrust if faces is to 
keep a low profile in global politics (Shi 2008: 25–26). China´ s conceptual answer is to project 
the image of a soft power which is engaged in multilateral cooperation and abstains from the 
use of force. As this concept stresses the non-military, especially the economic and cultural 
abilities of a state to influence international politics, it is theoretically an ideal political 
response of the CPC to the “China threat” perceptions of the outside world (cf. Yu 2007: 
118–119; Yang 2007). Yet, while the soft power label seems an adequate description of the 
potential and the limits of the European Union in international politics, it gravely underrates 
China’s current political and military might: Beijing has already developed into a powerful 
smart power. 
3.2 Theoretical Conceptualization of China’s Rise: Offensive Realism 
Responding to the fundamental structural changes after the demise of the stable Cold War 
order and the perceived limits of Kenneth Waltz´  (defensive) Neorealism (Mearsheimer 2004: 
109–112), John Mearsheimer developed a security orientated approach that has become 
popular in International Security Studies. Contradicting defensive realist assumptions that due 
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to the anarchic international system states aim to increase their security, yet aspiring only 
an “appropriate” amount of power that does not lure others in an arms race, Mearsheimer 
believes that the great powers must seek as much power as possible. He poses that this is a 
rational response of the governments which, undisturbed by domestic logics, simply “read” 
the “objective” incentives and constraints of the international system, but can never trust the 
(future) intentions of other nations. Similar to a classical Greek play, tragedy is inescapable: 
the more power one of the great nations acquires relative to others, the more pressure do the 
others face to maximize their might (Mearsheimer 2003: 35). 
Global dominance, though, Mearsheimers believes, is not feasible anymore because 
geography still limits global power projection. Being rational actors in a self-help world, 
it is thus wise for (potential) great powers to strive for regional hegemony. Furthermore, 
Mearsheimer (2003: chap. 2) postulates that great powers must check rising nations in other 
world regions too – otherwise they would rather sooner than later see themselves challenged 
in their very own hemisphere by their opponent (Mearsheimer 2003: 2 and 41). China’s rise, he 
claims, fits into this classical great power pattern. Consequently, it is only a question of time 
until Beijing starts to translate its economic might into military and political power, aiming 
to dominate East Asia. Yet, based on his solely structural reading of the international system, 
Mearsheimer predicts that 
“It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on a rampage and conquer 
other Asian countries, although that is always possible. Instead, it is more likely that it will want to 
dictate the boundaries of acceptable behaviour to neighbouring countries (…)” (Mearsheimer 2005: 
14). 
As the Chicago professor deliberately limits the scope of his theory to great power relations he 
necessarily views Washington as the only counterweight. Believing that many other East Asian 
nations fear Beijing’s increasing power, he claims they would join a US-led attempt to contain 
Beijing and slow down its economic growth (Mearsheimer 2003: 402; Layne 2008: 16–17). 
Logically, in Mearsheimer’s worldview, the prospects for cooperation are limited. 
Collaboration is an instrument for the great powers to counter-balance their rivals, for 
smaller nations to either bandwagon or join a counter-alliance of one of the great powers 
(cf. Snyder 2002: 164–167 and 172). Mearsheimer stresses the neorealist belief that relative 
gains consideration and cheating undermine all cooperation efforts (Mearsheimer 1995: 12; 
but cf. Keohane & Martin 1995: 43–46). Another crucial obstacle for him is the impossibility 
of governments to judge the true (future) intentions of their counterparts. Possible positive 
incentives of the domestic systems for international cooperation are also excluded in 
Mearsheimer’s approach, so are prospects for policy-learning, based on successes and rewards 
achieved through absolute gains cooperation. Institutions, in the neoliberal institutionalist 
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view quasi-independent facilitators for state cooperation, are regarded as dominated by 
governments, reflecting their national interests (Mearsheimer 1995: 13). 
Yet, I believe, that the dimension of cooperation can be conceptually included into 
offensive Realism, without contradicting its fundamental assumptions. Mearsheimer’s theory is 
pessimistic, yet it does not necessarily stipulate an automatism that leads to war. Containment 
like during the relative stable Cold War era is a possibility. Though, the containment strategy 
in Europe was based on a multilateral political, economic and military cooperation, even 
an alliance between North America and Western Europe. Furthermore, despite Moscows 
predominance and the character of forced cooperation, even the Eastern Block nations 
collaborated in a depth that exceeded the classic counter-alliance or bandwagon concepts. 
Due to the economic interdependence and superpower détente, from the 1970s on the two 
blocks used multilateral negotiations, in particular the confidence-building CSCE process, 
as means to decrease their tensions. Overall, this cooperative security mechanism did not 
end the regional and global rivalries of the superpowers but it contributed to a peaceful 
settlement of the conflicts in Europe. 
One of Mearsheimer’s key assumptions, however, would be challenged if it could be 
demonstrated that cooperation can change the behaviour of states, for instance, to make them 
more inclined towards peaceful multilateral cooperation or towards the notion of sharing the 
economic or security benefits with their neighbours. The next chapters will examine whether 
China has really embraced regional cooperation in East and Central Asia. 
3.2.1 China’s Rationales for its Engagement in the ARF 
To engage China in the ARF was a tremendous achievement for ASEAN, yet without Beijing´ s 
explicit will to become a player in ARF, ASEAN would not have succeeded. Thus it has to be 
asked why the Chinese leadership – till the 1990s not used to multilateralism – has commited 
itself to the ARF process. 
Fearing the internationalization of the Taiwan conflict or of the territorial disputes in 
the South Chinese Sea and the institutionalisation of the US dominance in East Asia, Beijing 
viewed the ARF very skeptical initially. It feared that ASEAN, during the Cold War regarded as 
a Western dominated, anti-Communist institution would promote Washington´ s interests. In 
the mid-1990s, due to intensified relations, China quickly learned that regional cooperation is 
not directed against Beijing. It increasingly acknowledged ASEAN s´ role as an honest (Asian) 
broker that embraces similar diplomatic values such as sovereignty, non-interference and 
consensual decision-making (cf. interviews in Singapore, December 2008). Moreover, Beijing 
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and ASEAN share the notions of output legitimacy and comprehensive security, and both 
reject the Western advocacy of human rights and democracy. The Chinese leaders could 
therefore regard the ARF, inter alia, as a tool to counter-balance the United States and 
Western influences in general (cf. Cheng 2004: 260–261). Another motive for joining the ARF 
was its institutional weakness – its lack of power to sanction members in case of misconduct 
suited Beijing. 
As the ARF strengthened its confidence building measures, thus increasing mutual trust 
through dialogue and transparency, Beijing deepened its commitment. The concrete work in 
the ARF required an adaption of the Chinese foreign policy and military experts who were not 
as familiar with multilateral diplomacy as their East Asian partners. In the late 1990s certain 
observers (Johnston 1999; Foot 1998; cf. Heller 2005: 141–142) noticed a transformative 
effect of China’s participation in the ARF, reflected not only through a “tremendous change” 
(Ba 2003: 622) in the Sino-ASEAN relations since 1989 but in Beijing´ s new commitment to 
multilateralism in general. For instance, in 2002 China signed the TAC and in 2003 agreed to 
multilateral cooperation to resolve the territorial disputes in the South Chinese Sea (yet notably 
the conflict with Vietnam remains) and transnational threats such as health, environmental 
degradation, migration or drug trafficking (Economy 2005: 417–418 and 421–423). Hence it is 
no coincidence that at the same time as Beijing multilateralized its policies in East Asia, it 
also started to actively promote regional cooperation in Central Asia. 
3.2.2 China’s Rationales for its Engagement in the SCO 
Strategically located at the crossroads of Asia and Europe, Central Asia has always been a 
theoretical paradise for realist International Relations scholars: already in 1904, Halford J. 
Mackinder has in his Heartland Theory postulated the global dominance of the power that 
controls this region. National interests and the attempt to create spheres of influence – in 
other words: power politics – can still explain the regional dynamics in this resource rich region. 
Since the 18th century under Russian control, the decline of Moscow s´ power after the end 
of the Cold War has led to a power vacuum in this former buffer zone. Both Washington and 
Beijing were eager to fill this void, deepening their political, military and economic relations 
with the newly independent nations. Initially focusing on securing their access to oil and 
gas fields, because of 9/11 and the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan the United 
States increased its military presence; for instance, it rented military bases in Uzbekistan. 
Moscow, on the other side, has in the last years reclaimed its place in its “near abroad”. 
Hence the logic of offensive Realism seems striking: Both China and Russia, two longstanding 
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rivals, need to become the regional hegemon in Central Asia at the other´ s expense, whereas 
the United States attempts to prevent the regional ascendancy of both countries. Accordingly, 
cooperation can only be applied selectively and as a tool for achieving hegemony, for counter-
balancing or bandwagoning. Subsequently, it will be tested whether this instrumental view 
can explain the evolution of intergovernmental collaboration in a region that has once again 
become geostrategically and geoeconomically vital. 
Like in East Asia, multilateral collaboration started only in the mid-1990s with the Shanghai 
Five mechanism at its core. In 1996 the Shanghai Five provided a forum for resolving longstanding 
bi- and multilateral border conflicts among the members China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan as well as for strengthening their border control mechanisms to tackle illegal 
trafficking of people, drugs and weapons. As the traditional security cooperation has proven 
surprisingly successful, in 2001 the Shanghai Five members agreed to let it spill over into other 
non-traditional security affairs and transformed the mechanism into a cooperative security 
institution, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The collaboration, though, remains strictly 
intergovernmental and under-institutionalized, because the SCO members deliberately do not 
envision supranational integration (Bailes & Dunay 2007: 4–5; cf. Chung 2006). The governments 
thus control the cooperation processes – the secretariat is weak and the national parliaments 
lack control rights –, and the objectives are based on their national security interests. The 
dominant players, of course, are the two great powers, while the smaller nations are at best 
partially successful in influencing China or Russia in siding with one of them against the other. 
Still, they are strategically better off in a situation in which they can deal in a multilateral 
forum rather than bilaterally with these two key players. 
While the security definitions of the SCO and the ARF are very similar, the collaboration in 
the SCO is far more concrete. For the SCO, security encompasses socioeconomic development, 
energy and environment and includes complex, yet very real transnational non-traditional 
risks such as terrorism, organized crime, illegal trafficking of people, weapons and drugs, 
the latter in particular via Afghanistan (Cornell & Swanström 2006). Also in a reaction to the 
war in Afghanistan, China and Russia, both suspicious of Washington` s military engagement, 
promoted stronger common counter-terrorism efforts, loosely institutionalized in the Regional 
Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS). The SCO members also agreed to insulate the subregion from 
the spread of democracy, enabling them to individually and collectively dismiss even legitimate 
claims for democratization and autonomy as separatism or terrorism. 
The main difference between China` s participation in the ARF and the SCO is that from 
the beginnings of the Central Asian cooperation, China has been in the driver’s seat. The 
“Shanghai spirit” of cooperation, albeit compatible with the “ASEAN way”, is clearly a “Chinese” 
one. China initiated the Central Asian cooperation because it recognized that the main non-
131
traditional security menaces can best be resolved in a multilateral manner. In general, Beijing 
needs a peaceful Central Asian neighbourhood to achieve its energy security objectives and 
to develop its vast Western province. It also succeeded in regionally outlawing the Uighur 
separatist movement, notably the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), thus ending the 
support the ETIM has allegedly received from its Central Asian neighbours. 
In regard to the evolution of the SCO, Beijing is far more ambitious than Moscow: Whereas 
the Chinese side promotes a deepening of trade and economic collaboration, Russia is reluctant, 
as it regards the SCO primarily as a means to pursue energy security (Cohen 2006: 2). This 
because it already posses forums in Central Asia that it exclusively dominates, such as the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO). And not at least does Russia` s distrust of China limit collaboration. Among many 
Russian politicians and scholars Beijing is not only perceived as a strategic rival but, for the 
first time in centuries, as more powerful than Moscow, raising fears that Russia is becoming 
dependent, possibly even China’s vassal (Mohanty 2007: 255). 
Despite the shared goal of reducing Washington’s influence in this crucial region and 
fighting separatism and terrorism, the strategic rivalry between China and Russia reduces 
the prospects of a deepening of cooperation in Central Asia (Li 2007: 484–487). Accordingly 
– and notwithstanding the increased Sino-Chinese military cooperation that includes Russian 
weapons sales to China and even military manoeuvres –, the prospects of the evolution of the 
SCO into an authoritarian Central Asian NATO that strongly opposes Western influences and 
values are dim. Rather it will remain a surprisingly successful forum for discussing and even 
resolving some of the most dangerous transnational non-traditional security risks in Central 
Asia on a case by case basis. Whether the SCO can develop into a reliable regional security 
institution that interlinks Central Asia politically and institutionally with the existing trans-
Atlantic, South, South-East and North-East Asian organizations (cf. Lanteigne 2007: 620–622; 
Luzyanin 2007) will depend on the future Sino-Russian relations as well as on the general 
Western - Russian and Western - Chinese relations. To sum up, national interests and power 
politics – and thus Neorealism – still explain best the successful but limited collaboration in 
Central Asia. The SCO members have never intended to use collaboration as a tool to change 
their diplomatic values or behaviour. 
4. Conclusion 
Regional cooperation in South-East Asia has always followed economic rationales and been 
externally and in particular security driven. Consequently, the emergence of the China factor 
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as a new external driving force for increased cooperation is not a new phenomenon per se. 
Fundamentally new, though, is that Beijing’s economic, political and military rise to a great 
power undermines the hegemonic position of the United States, thus changing the traditional 
balance of power in East Asia. Aiming to engage China and keeping the United States involved 
in order to stabilize the existing regional order, ASEAN succeeded in establishing the ARF, a 
broad security forum in regard to the membership and the security topics covered. In the 
mid-1990s all ARF participants accepted ASEAN s´ leadership. Though, today in order to remain 
the key institutional driving force in East Asia with the regional powerhouses China, Japan and 
India, ASEAN has to deepen its own integration (Wanandi 2005: 330). 
Just like in North-East Asia, regional collaboration is a recent phenomenon in Central Asia. 
While in the case of the ARF the “China threat” is a “negative” driving force, in the SCO China 
is the active leader that engages the other great power Russia and the smaller Central Asian 
nations in a successful cooperative security mechanism. Similar to the ARF, the SCO is strictly 
intergovernmental and based on a comprehensive definition of security and an evolutionary 
approach. However, unlike in the ARF, the collaboration is focused on concrete projects and 
has already yielded results (the resolution of border disputes, energy and infrastructure 
collaboration, increased economic relations). Nevertheless, the cooperation in the SCO still 
follows the principle of power politics and, consequently, has not altered the diplomatic 
attitudes and the actual behaviour of the SCO members. A prediction based on offensive 
Realism suggests that cooperation will only prevail as long as the governments regard it as 
useful. 
The case study of the ARF has demonstrated that regional security cooperation promoted 
by an alliance of smaller nations is feasible and viable. The main insecurity the South-East 
and North-East Asian nations have to cope with is that they cannot predict whether China` s 
rise will remain to be peaceful. Through multilateral cooperation in the ARF, but also in 
ASEAN+3, they can get insights into the strategic and diplomatic thinking and perceptions 
of their Chinese counterparts who today seem to have embraced multilateralism. For China, 
cooperation clearly has an instrumental value – a peaceful regional order facilitates its 
socioeconomic development. Moreover, multilateral collaboration is also a strong political 
message against Washington’s unilateralism. 
Overall, one can speak of an enlightened multilateralism Beijing´ s pursues, in particular 
in East Asia. Though does cooperation also has an intrinsic value for the Chinese leadership? 
Referring to constructivist, sociological and neoliberal institutional approaches, certain 
scholars believe in China` s new multilateralism (Heller 2005: 141–142; Johnston 1999; Foot 1998), 
even that it sticks to the “ASEAN way” (cf. interviews in Singapore, Hanoi and Kuala Lumpur, 
December 2008). Others dismiss the notion that Beijing has truly embraced multilateralism 
133
(Mearsheimer 2005; cf. Economy 2005: 413). They see a pattern of hegemonic aspirations in 
the Chinese history (Ong 2007: 721) or remain cautious, claiming that it is still too early to 
judge whether China´ s socialization in the ARF has been successful (Chung 2008: 172). Yet 
time is not the sole crucial variable. Social science approaches in general struggle to explain 
how and why decision-makers view the world in a certain manner and are why some are more 
inclined towards cooperation than others. 
Scholars and politicians who regard the Chinese foreign policy through the lense of offensive 
Realism can logically never be convinced of Beijing´ s multilateral commitments. Offensive 
Realism postulates the inability of states to demonstrate their peaceful aims, as other 
governments can never be sure of their true beliefs and future plans. Would this approach 
consider domestic political logics – the CPC` s output legitimacy requires a stable regional 
order for China` s socioeconomic development – and the Asian “ideology” of pragmatism, it 
would see that Beijing clearly has inducements for multilateral collaboration. 
To conclude, cooperation can be included without contradicting the core assumptions 
of offensive Realism. For this, however, offensive Realists have to accept that there is no 
structural automatism or tragic script the world leaders have to follow. Cooperation certainly 
has the potential to alter perceptions as well as the actual behaviour of states, though 
Mearsheimer` s approach is conceptually not suited to prove this thesis. And therein lies the 
tragic of offensive Realism and similar neorealist concepts: May they be based on theoretical 
assumptions that either postulate a tragic automatism in international politics, on approaches 
that are conceptually not interested in acknowledging policy-learning or simply on ideologies 
disguised as scientific theories: perceptions that a priori discard any possible change of 
behaviour induced through active cooperation are scientifically unsound – and politically 
dangerous. The resulting policies may offer China or other rising powers not enough political, 
economic or security incentives to further pursue multilateral cooperation, both regionally 
and globally. 
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